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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The oil-rich Gulf countries comprise a region with exceptionally high international migration of 
persons originating from a wide range of countries. The six countries that comprise this sub-region 
include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, SaudivArabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are joined 
together for several purposes in an association known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For the last 
three decades expatriates have come to outnumber nationals in several of the GCC countries’ 
populations. During the 1970s and 1980s, large scale migration of “guest” workers started as a response 
to the increase in the price of oil, and the consequent plans of the GCC countries for rapid development. 
Such plans necessitated the import of very large numbers of foreign workers since the indigenous labor 
forces were usually small in number and did not have the variety of skills required for the development of 
infrastructure and other projects. In the initial stages, construction workers were a major category of 
workers imported. While the demand for construction workers declined somewhat with the completion of 
projects, a persistent demand for such workers still exists, especially for the creation of new housing 
projects and buildings required for the growing number of nationals. The GCC countries have fairly high 
population growth rates and the number of births per woman is generally more than 4 in case of most 
countries. In some countries such as the UAE, construction projects are also under way as a means of 
investment, especially in Dubai. 
Besides construction workers, another major category of workers consists of those in cleaning services, 
helpers, and domestic service. Among domestic workers, women generally constitute a majority in most 
of the GCC countries. Among the sending countries, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia and India are the 
major ones. Over the years, the number of domestic workers has been increasing. In Kuwait, for example, 
housemaids comprised 7.1 % of Kuwait’s population (of 2.87 million) and numbered 203,406 in 2005 
(PACI, 2005). 
Table 1 indicates the predominance of expatriates in Gulf countries. The percentage of non-nationals 
ranged from a low of 24% in Oman to 78% in Qatar in 2005. In case of the labor force, more than half in 
each country comprised expatriates in the early 2000s. In 2005, the combined estimated GCC population 
was 35.8 million with expatriates constituting 12.8 million (35.7 %). It was estimated that if the expatriate 
population continued to increase at the present rate it might reach 18 million after ten years. UN 
estimates for 2005 indicate that in the largest GCC country, Saudi Arabia, foreigners constitute 6.4 million 
(or 26 %) of the 24.5 million residents. Some other sources report the number of foreigners to be as high 
as 8.8 million. However, various estimates suggest that foreigners comprise 56-70% of the labor force 
and 95 % of the private sector workforce. In UAE, foreigners constitute 71 % of the 4.5 million residents 
(Table 1); and fill 98% of the private sector jobs. 
The continued predominance of foreign workers in the population and labor force of the GCC countries 
has been accompanied by a whole range of policies to regulate and manage such migration. A general 
policy aimed at curtailing the number of foreign workers has been present for several years. This general 
policy started getting translated into action and implementation through various means during the mid 
1990s. The goal of this paper is to highlight the major policies and discuss some of the social and 
economic factors that may facilitate or hinder their effective implementation. An important reason for the 
increasingly active and forceful implementation of policies to reduce migration is the rising levels of 
unemployment in the GCC countries, described in the next section. 
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1. Introduction 
The oil-rich Gulf countries comprise a region with exceptionally high 
international migration of persons originating from a wide range of countries. The six 
countries that comprise this sub-region include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are joined together for several purposes 
in an association known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For the last three 
decades expatriates have come to outnumber nationals in several of the GCC countries’ 
populations. During the 1970s and 1980s, large scale migration of “guest” workers 
started as a response to the increase in the price of oil, and the consequent plans of the 
GCC countries for rapid development. Such plans necessitated the import of very large 
numbers of foreign workers since the indigenous labor forces were usually small in 
number and did not have the variety of skills required for the development of 
infrastructure and other projects. In the initial stages, construction workers were a major 
category of workers imported. While the demand for construction workers declined 
somewhat with the completion of projects, a persistent demand for such workers still 
exists, especially for the creation of new housing projects and buildings required for the 
growing number of nationals. The GCC countries have fairly high population growth 
rates and the number of births per woman is generally more than 4 in case of most 
countries. In some countries such as the UAE, construction projects are also under way as 
a means of investment, especially in Dubai.  
Besides construction workers, another major category of workers consists of those 
in cleaning services, helpers, and domestic service. Among domestic workers, women 
generally constitute a majority in most of the GCC countries. Among the sending 
countries, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia and India are the major ones. Over the years, 
* Professor, Department of Community Medicine and Behavioural Sciences, Kuwait 
University – Faculty of Medicine. 
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the number of domestic workers has been increasing. In Kuwait, for example, 
housemaids comprised 7.1 % of Kuwait’s population (of 2.87 million) and numbered 
203,406 in 2005 (PACI, 2005). 
Table 1 indicates the predominance of expatriates in Gulf countries. The 
percentage of non-nationals ranged from a low of 24% in Oman to 78% in Qatar in 2005. 
In case of the labor force, more than half in each country comprised expatriates in the 
early 2000s. In 2005, the combined estimated GCC population was 35.8 million with 
expatriates constituting 12.8 million (35.7 %). It was estimated that if the expatriate 
population continued to increase at the present rate it might reach 18 million after ten 
years (Kuwait Times, December 20, 2004). UN estimates for 2005 indicate that in the 
largest GCC country, Saudi Arabia, foreigners constitute 6.4 million (or 26 %) of the 24.5 
million residents (UN, 2006). Some other sources report the number of foreigners to be as 
high as 8.8 million. However, various estimates suggest that foreigners comprise 56-70 % 
of the labor force and 95 % of the private sector workforce.  In UAE, foreigners 
constitute 71 % of the 4.5 million residents (Table 1); and fill 98 % of the private sector 
jobs (Migrant News, December 2005). 
The continued predominance of foreign workers in the population and labor force 
of the GCC countries has been accompanied by a whole range of policies to regulate and 
manage such migration. A general policy aimed at curtailing the number of foreign 
workers has been present for several years. This general policy started getting translated 
into action and implementation through various means during the mid 1990s. The goal of 
this paper is to highlight the major policies and discuss some of the social and economic 
factors that may facilitate or hinder their effective implementation. An important reason 
for the increasingly active and forceful implementation of policies to reduce migration is 
the rising levels of unemployment in the GCC countries, described in the next section. 
1.1. Rising Unemployment: A driving force behind restrictive policies 
A major reason for the restrictive policies is the rising level of unemployment 
among the nationals that has been raising difficult economic and political questions for 
the governments. Reliable and consistent data on unemployment in the GCC countries is 
unavailable. A recent ESCWA publication provides such information disaggregated for 
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males and females for various years during the 1990s and early 2000s (Table 2). Among 
the six GCC countries, Oman is reported to have an especially high unemployment rate, 
especially among females with 37 % of them unemployed in 1996. Media reports relating 
to more recent time periods, however, indicate that the data shown in Table 2 probably 
underestimate the level of unemployment currently prevalent in most countries. The 
following account illustrates this point vividly. Unemployment in Saudi Arabia, the 
largest GCC country, had increased to about 13% among all males in 2004 and is 
estimated to be as high as 35% among the youth aged 20-24 (Wall Street Journal, April 1, 
2004, pg A1). Male unemployment rate went up progressively from 7.6 % in 1999 to 9 % 
in 2000, 10.5 % in 2001, 11.9 % in 2002 and 12.5 % in 2003 (Arab News, April 15, 
2004). The country is also faced with a demographic tidal wave of those 56% aged less 
than 20 who are expected to enter the labor force in the next two decades, amounting to a 
total of about 100,000 new jobs required per year ((Arab News (Saudi Arabia), Feb 5, 
2004). In Bahrain, unemployment stands at 15 % (The Gulf News(UAE), February 11, 
2003). Unemployment has already resulted in some political unrest, such as the sit-ins 
outside the Assembly in Bahrain. In the UAE, it is estimated by the head of labor market 
studies at Tanmia (the national human resource development and employment authority) 
that current actual unemployment figures among UAE nationals could reach as high as 
40,000 (AMN, June 1-15, 2005). Some economists have concluded that unemployment is 
“the biggest policy challenge facing the GCC at the moment” (www.gulfbusiness.com,
December 1, 2004). 
1.2. Expressed government policies to reduce future immigration 
Foreign workers have helped in the rapid transformation of the infrastructure as 
well as institutional development in the Gulf and they were generally welcome until a 
few years ago. At the same time, Gulf countries have been making statements about the 
need for indigenization of the labor force and a reduction in the percentage of the 
expatriate population and workers for many years. However, during the last decade or so, 
concrete policies aimed at enhancing indigenization and reducing the numbers of foreign 
workers have actually begun to be implemented.  
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In terms of their attitudes towards future migration flows, all the Gulf countries 
would like to reduce the number of expatriate workers in their population. Most of them 
have expressed these attitudes in response to the UN surveys eliciting opinions on the 
level of immigration and emigration. In 2005, five of the six oil-rich Gulf Cooperation 
(GCC) countries (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE)) considered the immigration level to their countries to be too high and expressed a 
desire to lower it. The remaining country, Bahrain, considered the level to be satisfactory, 
however. Bahrain stated it had a policy to maintain the immigration level (Table 3) (UN, 
2006).  A review of the opinions, attitudes and policies towards immigration in the Gulf 
region indicates that in all six countries the trend towards restricting the inflows has 
increased. Also, steps towards the actual implementation of the long standing policies are 
more actively being taken and enforced.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have responded more specifically to the UN query on 
policies regarding immigration and emigration as shown in Table 4. Kuwait has a policy 
to lower the permanent settlement of immigrants and its policy for granting citizenship is 
highly restricted. In addition to its general policy for curtailing labor migration, Kuwait 
also has a policy to lower the number of dependents of migrant workers. One of the ways 
in which the country fulfills this policy is by putting a salary ceiling on workers who are 
allowed to bring their family with them. Also, the country has no program for the 
integration of migrants since it views them as temporary workers who are in the country 
on renewable contracts that are awarded generally for about 2 years at a time. A listing of 
various restrictive policies that GCC countries have formulated and are putting in place to 
curb future migration is shown in Figure 1. A brief discussion of these policies is given 
below, and a comprehensive account may be found in Shah (2006). The existing policies 
may be divided into two broad types, those aiming to reduce the supply of foreign 
workers and the ones aiming to enhance the growth and demand for indigenous workers. 
Each is discussed in turn. 
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2. Policies aimed at affecting supply of foreign and demand for local workers 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the policies meant to affect the supply and 
demand of workers, it may be noted that most of the day to day policies relate to the 
regulation of migrant workers. Migrant workers are not entitled to citizenship by virtue of 
their length of stay in the GCC countries. Also, children born in the country are not 
entitled to citizenship. Research from Kuwait has shown that expatriates often stay in the 
country for prolonged periods of time exceeding 20 years in some cases (Shah, 2004). In 
most GCC countries, there is no provision for “permanent resident” status. Regardless of 
their duration of stay expatriates are defined as “temporary” workers, a fact that is 
reinforced by the renewal of contracts for relatively short time periods, usually not more 
than two years. A migrant worker comes to Kuwait on the basis of a work contract issued 
upon the request of a sponsor. Once in the host country, the worker must obtain a 
residence permit (or iqama), which is issued only for the period of the contract.
2.1. Policies aimed to restrict supply of workers 
2.1.1. Rise in cost of living
Indirect taxes that raise revenue for the host country and make life more 
expensive for the expatriates can have the impact of reducing the attractiveness of the 
Gulf market as a destination site. An example is health fees instituted in Kuwait in 1999 
and in Saudi Arabia in 2001. In the UAE which has had a policy of health insurance for 
the last several years, a new fee for all surgical procedures was recently introduced, much 
to the unhappiness of several expatriates. A fee ranging from 500-4000 dirhams (Dh) 
(US$ 136 to $1089) was imposed, depending on the type and complexity of the surgery 
(Kuwait Times, May 9, 2005). According to a new health insurance scheme to be 
implemented in the UAE in 2006, the employer will no longer be required to pay for the 
mandatory health insurance for the workers. The employees would have to pay the 
premium for their national health insurance thus bearing additional costs in a situation 
where the wages are already fairly stagnant (AMN, January 15-31, 2006). 
A migrant worker in Kuwait must buy a health insurance for himself as well as 
each member of his family, if accompanying him. The employer often does not pay such 
insurance in the private sector where about 93 % of all expatriates work (PACI, 2005). 
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Even in cases when the employer pays the yearly insurance premium, each visit to the 
primary care clinic entails a fee of 1 Kuwaiti dinar (KD) ($ 3.4) and to the hospital a fee 
of 2 KD ($ 6.8). For an ordinary worker who generally earns around 100-150 dollars a 
month, the cost may be considerable. For certain specialized tests such as an MRI 
additional fee must be paid. At the time when the health fee was implemented in 1999, 
several foreign workers in Kuwait decided to send their dependent wives and children to 
the home country since they could not afford to pay health insurance. 
Expatriates are complaining in the UAE about the exorbitant fees now being 
charged for the verification of their university degree certificates after the change in this 
process in 2005. Under the new Degree Verification Program, expatriates must send their 
attested degree certificates through IntegraScreen, a document verification company, via 
Emirates Post. This process would cost Dh510 (US$ 139), whereas previously they had 
to pay only Dh100 (US$27) for attestation of the same documents at their home country 
and in the UAE (AMN, January 15-31, 2006).  
In Saudi Arabia a more direct tax consists of a fund (100 Saudi riyals or 26.6 US 
dollars) collected from each foreign worker per year towards the establishment of training 
programs for indigenous workers (Arab News (Saudi Arabia), July 10, 2002). A proposal 
for such a tax was also being considered in the UAE where an annual fee of Dh 100 (US$ 
27) would be collected from each expatriate renewing or issuing his labor card. This fee 
would then be used to develop a fund to train UAE nationals (The Gulf News (UAE), 
September 9, 2003). 
2.1.2. Nabbing and deportation of overstayers and illegals 
An irregular or illegal migrant can be found in the GCC countries as a result of 
any of the following. First, a person may enter the country illegally (either without 
required documents or with fictitious documents). Occasionally accounts of trafficking 
and human smuggling across the Gulf are found in the newspapers but this type of illegal 
entry is quite rare. Second, the person may become illegal through overstaying after the 
contract and the legal residence period has expired. Estimates of this type of illegal 
migration are substantial, judging from the repeated periods of amnesty declared by 
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various countries to allow the overstayers to leave without paying substantial fines (Shah, 
2004; Shah, 2006).
The third type of irregular stay occurs when a migrant worker takes up 
employment for a person other than the sponsor. This type of irregular stay is again quite 
substantial but no systematic or reliable information on which is available from routinely 
collected data. The main reason for the occurrence of this type of irregular migration may 
be described as follows. Nationals of GCC countries may obtain business licenses and 
concomitant permission to import a given number of workers, and are thus given work 
visas for this purpose. They may, however, sell the visas to persons looking for such visas 
instead of starting a business or using all the visas for the approved business. This type of 
visa trading has become fairly widespread in the GCC countries. The person who buys 
the visa may find a job with an employer other than the one who initially sponsored 
him/her. This puts the migrant worker in an illegal status since legally he is not allowed 
to work for any one other than the sponsor. Media reports indicate that visa trading is 
recognized as an important problem in orderly management of labor migration but 
remains an area where the statistical database is very weak. 
Vigorous efforts have been made in Saudi Arabia in recent years to nab and 
deport those who may have overstayed their visa duration as well as those who may have 
an illegal visa status. In June, 2005 Saudi authorities arrested more than 2,700 visa 
violators in certain districts of Jeddah most of whom were from Arab and African 
countries. The arrests resulted in the closure of 45 illegal clothing factories, several 
prostitution dens and factories producing alcoholic beverages (Asian Migration News, 
June 1-15, 2005). One of the consequences of overstay has been the presence of homeless 
persons on the streets in Saudi Arabia, trying to survive in makeshift shelters. The Human 
Rights Association estimates that despite the efforts at removing and deporting such 
people there are between 600-800 homeless people in the country, mostly women, 
children and elderly (AMN, October 1-15, 2005).  
As part of the overall effort to reduce the number of overstayers and illegals, Gulf 
countries have declared repeated periods of amnesty since mid 1990s to encourage the 
departure of those residing in the host countries in an illegal visa situation which is 
largely a result of being employed by a company that is not the legal sponsor of the 
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worker. In the UAE, about 100,000 persons left in 2003 as a result of the amnesty 
program while the number of yearly deportees from Saudi Arabia is about 700,000 
(AMN, September 2005).  
In Kuwait the latest amnesty period was offered from November 20 to December 
31, 2004. According to the Indian and Filipino embassies the response to this amnesty 
from illegal residents wishing to leave was “overwhelming” (Kuwait Times, November 
22, 2004). According to the Department of Immigration within the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, an estimated 60,000 expatriates who have violated their visas are living in 
Kuwait. Oman announced an amnesty period that was extended to December 31, 2005 to 
enable overstayers to leave the country after paying a fine. An overstayer has to raise 
roughly Omani Riyal (RO) 400 (US$1,039), RO250 (US$649) for the fine and RO150 
(US$ 390) for the airfare. (AMN, Sept 15, 2005). A more detailed account of amnesty 
leavers may be found in Shah (2004). 
2.1.3.  Stricter regulation of visa issuance
A hard look is again being taken at the issuance of new work permits, and the 
transfer of existing work permits from one employer to another. All the GCC countries 
have policies to restrict the number of approved work visas (Fasano and Goyal, 2004). In 
February 2003, the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in Bahrain said that “from 2005, 
he was not prepared to renew or issue work permits for non-Bahrainis” with exceptions to 
be made for highly skilled workers not available among nationals. At the same time, the 
Cabinet approved a plan to allow local firms to apply for temporary work permits for 
foreigners limited only to six months (The Gulf News, February 11, 2003).
One of the strategies used by Saudi Arabia in 2004 to restrict labor import was the 
ban on visa issuance to new companies and those that employed less than 10 workers. 
Upon approaching the Labor Office, the Saudi employers whose requests for work 
permits had been denied were asked to hire Saudis. These employers responded that they 
either did not find Saudis for the jobs or they found ones who asked for a salary higher 
than the business could afford (Arab News (Saudi Arabia), April 30, 2004). The labor 
office, by putting the ban, was also trying to curb the practice of visa trading, as 
discussed below. 
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2.1.4. Restrictions on visa trading 
As mentioned earlier, a system of visa trading emerged during the last two to 
three decades because the demand for visas to the Gulf exceeded supply. In the UAE it is 
estimated that the number of workers sponsored by these fictitious companies in 2004 
was 600,000 or 27% of the total workforce (UAE-Gulf News, April 13, 2004). As part of 
its efforts to curb the hiring of illegal workers, 11,600 bans were issued against violating 
sponsors and companies during 2004 in the UAE (Gulf News Online (UAE), February 
22, 2005). The Saudi Minister of Labor recently said that 70% of the visas issued by the 
government are sold on the black market and the government was determined to crack 
down on this (Arab News (Saudi Arabia), April 29, 2004). Similar statements are 
repeatedly made by authorities in other GCC countries. The Bahrain Minister of Labor 
and Social Affairs recently lamented the practice that has plagued the Bahraini job 
market for the last 20 years. In August 2004, the government was undertaking a process 
of investigating 43 businesses found to engage in this practice (The Arab News, August 
4, 2004). The Kuwait Human Development report of 1997 acknowledged the presence of 
visa trading as one of the factors that promoted the influx of foreign workers to Kuwait 
and advocated the implementation of serious steps to curb this practice (Ministry of 
Planning, 1997).
The scale of the problem clearly illustrates that visa trading is a multi-million 
dollar industry. In the UAE, for example, a work visa for an Indian is sold for Dh 7,500 
(US$ 2,042) and for an Iranian for Dh 15,000 (US $ 4,084). A fundamental difficulty in 
the  implementation of any policies aimed at curbing visa trading is therefore the ease 
with which an ordinary local sponsor can have a continuous source of income coupled 
with a market in sending countries where many are eager to buy such visas at any cost. 
2.2. Policies aimed to increase the demand for indigenous workers 
2.2.1. Creating job opportunities through training  
In Saudi Arabia, millions of dollars are being spent on job-training, technical 
schools and cash incentives for Saudi companies to hire Saudi citizens. In some cases the 
government is paying half the salary in order to encourage private sector employers to 
hire national workers. The high price of oil in the last few years has resulted in a budget 
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surplus part of which is earmarked go to the Human Resource Development Fund, which 
subsidizes the salaries of as many as 30,000 Saudis each year as an incentive for 
companies to hire them.  
It is also planned that technical and vocational training institutes will build 59 
new campuses, doubling the number of annual graduates in fields such as cosmetology, 
computer programming, meat cutting, and plumbing. Nearly all jobs in the above fields 
are currently manned by foreigners (The Washington Post, August 31, 2004). In 2004, 
only about 13 % of the private-sector workforce in Saudi Arabia consisted of nationals 
even though the goal was to have 45 % nationals composing the private sector. Policies 
similar to the ones in Saudi Arabia are also being implemented in other GCC countries. 
2.2.2. Creating job opportunities through market based measures 
Raising the cost of hiring foreign workers is a possible strategy that may add a 
constraint to the demand for foreign workers. In Bahrain, the cost of hiring foreign 
domestic workers has gone up from BD50 (US$ 133) to BD150 (US$ 398) for various 
nationalities. The recruitment agencies are now charging BD150 more for Indonesian 
housemaids due to the stricter regulations imposed by Indonesia (AMN, November 1-15, 
2005).
2.2.3. Nationalization through administrative measures 
Direct policies and plans to phase out the reliance on foreign workers are in 
process. A decision was made in 2003 in Saudi Arabia by the Manpower Council under 
the direction of the Crown Prince to cap the level of expatriates and their dependents at 
20% of the population by 2013, and to halve the number of expatriate workers (Arab 
News (Saudi Arabia), April 16, 2003). Kuwait is implementing a ceiling of less than 35% 
expatriates to be employed in the government sector (Al-Ramadhan, 1995). Recently, the 
Civil Service Commission in Kuwait has set a new annual target of 15 % for replacing 
the expatriates in the government sector, increased from the earlier mark of 7 %, starting 
from April 1, 2006 (Kuwait Times, March 4, 2006, p.2).   
A focused strategy on the part of several GCC countries is to pinpoint the 
occupations where phasing out of expatriates will be done on a priority basis. In UAE, 
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the banking sector is one of the sectors where quotas for Emiratisation have been set up. 
However, it has been found that more than half the banks have not complied with this 
quota. They are willing to pay the penalty for non-compliance instead of hiring nationals, 
indicating the difficulties of implementing government policies on this matter (Gulf 
News (UAE), September 22, 2004). In Oman, which has the lowest percentage of non-
nationals among all GCC countries, a decision to create job opportunities for national 
women was recently made. Only Omani women are now allowed to sell abaya (women’s 
cloaks) in certain sections of Muscat as a means of reducing reliance on foreign workers 
(Agence France Press, July 1, 2004).  Oman is also making efforts to Omanise several 
other occupations such as those of cashiers, drivers, and security officers.
In the UAE, all the contractors signing deals with the Ministry of Public Works 
and Housing are being encouraged to employ national women engineers to reduce the 
pool of jobless female specialists (The Gulf News (UAE), February 12, 2003). The Dubai 
Naturalization and Residency department has ordered that public relations jobs be 
restricted to UAE nationals in order to generate more jobs for local job seekers (AMN, 
June 1-15, 2005). Another strategy to regulate and limit the inflow of foreign workers is 
the implementation of a quota system whereby guidelines are provided to the companies 
to diversify the workers they hire from any single nationality in order to achieve a culture 
balance. Companies in which workers of any one nationality exceed 30 % have to pay a 
higher fee (AMN, June 1-15, 2005).
In Saudi Arabia, 25 occupations designed for phasing out expatriates have been 
identified, including travel, gold and jewelry shops, grocery stores etc. (Wall Street 
Journal, April 1, 2004, pg A1). The government is extremely serious in implementing 
these policies judging from the enforcement raids that are being launched to ensure that 
the guidelines for employment of Saudis are being followed. In Jeddah, it was found that 
60% of the gold shops are owned by expatriates and many remained closed when the law 
came into effect (Arab News (Saudi Arabia), Feb, 24, 2004).  
Kuwait has also joined the other GCC countries recently by specifying 16 jobs 
which are no longer open to expatriates. Such jobs include computer programming, 
computer operation and data entry, secretarial, typing and clerical jobs, cashiers, and car 
drivers etc. (Kuwait Times, March 4, 2006, p.2). 
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3. Probable effectiveness of current policies 
The main thrust of the current policies is to restrict the stocks and flows of foreign 
workers (and their families) and enhance the absorption of nationals in the labor force. In 
order for the above policies to succeed, two strategies that are inherently related to each 
other are essential. First, restricting the import of additional foreign workers and retiring 
or firing the existing ones. Second, the replacement of foreign workers by indigenous 
ones. Numerous difficulties are inherent in both of these possible strategies, as illustrated 
below by using the case of Kuwait. 
An examination of the occupational distribution of Kuwaiti males and females 
indicates that both sexes are concentrated in only a few occupations (Table 5). For 
example, more than half the males were employed in a single occupational category 
working as clerks, while a fifth were employed in professional and technical work at the 
end of 2005. The concentration among women was even more pronounced with 85 % 
working in either a professional/technical job or a clerical job. When the above 
distribution is compared with that of non-Kuwaitis, shown in Table 6, major differences 
are observed. We find that 51 % of the non-Kuwaiti males were employed as production 
workers and laborers (compared with only 8 % among Kuwaiti males) while 21 % were 
employed in the services sector. Among non-Kuwaiti women, occupational concentration 
was truly extreme with 71 % working in the services sector, primarily as housemaids. 
About 10 % of non-Kuwaiti women were working in professional or technical and 6 % in 
clerical occupations.
Thus, a comparison of the occupational distributions in Tables 5 and 6 clearly 
shows that Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis are fulfilling very different roles in the Kuwaiti 
economy. Among non-Kuwaitis males, for example, more than 600,000 are engaged in 
production related or general labor work. This number is more than three times as high as 
the total labor force of Kuwaiti males. Hence, the country simply does not have the 
requisite number of people to fulfill the required jobs, assuming that all these jobs are 
essential for the growth of the Kuwaiti economy. In addition to the shortage of numbers, 
it is well known that nationals do not consider production and labor occupations as 
“desirable” jobs. They have a preference for professional/technical and clerical jobs. In 
case of women, it would socially be almost unimaginable that a Kuwaiti woman would 
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work as a domestic helper in another Kuwaiti’s home. Hence, certain occupations have 
come to be defined as culturally appropriate only for non-Kuwaitis, and nationals would 
be greatly reluctant to take them up. Hence, in a situation where the two groups are 
performing very different tasks, replacement of one by the other is bound to be very 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Additional insight into the factors that may limit the effectiveness of replacement 
policies is provided in Table 7, which disaggregates the male and female occupational 
distributions of Kuwaiti nationals by public vs. private sector of activity. About 90 % of 
each sex was employed in the public sector in 2005. With the exception of administrative 
and sales occupations, almost 90 % of Kuwaiti males were employed in the public sector 
within each occupational category. A similar situation existed for Kuwaiti females, where 
negligible percentages were participating in the administrative and sales occupations 
anyhow. Table 7 shows that two-thirds of Kuwaiti males working in sales related 
occupations were employed in the private sector which appears to suggest a large amount 
of replacement of non-Kuwaitis by Kuwaiti nationals. While this may be true to some 
degree, it should be noted that the sales sector was a relatively small one, employing only 
1.3 % of all Kuwaiti males and 5.5 % of all non-Kuwaiti males. Similarly, the 
administrative and managerial sector employed only 3.3 % of the male Kuwaiti labor 
force. The above data are in sharp contrast to the sectoral composition of non-Kuwaiti 
workers 93 % of who were employed in the private sector. Of the total labor force in 
Kuwait, the private sector constituted 78 %. Kuwaitis filled 2.3 % of all the private sector 
jobs. The relative contribution to the total private sector jobs by Kuwaiti men and women 
was 1.3 % and 0.9 % , respectively (PACI, 2005). 
The two main conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis of Kuwaiti and 
non-Kuwaiti occupational distributions are as follows. First, there is an apparent need for 
a larger number of nationals. The national labor force constitutes only about 18 % of the 
total labor force. Hence, additional hands are needed to fill all the jobs the economy 
seems to have room for. Second, non-nationals are typically occupying jobs that are 
economically and socially at the relatively lowest levels in the occupational distribution. 
It is debatable whether all these jobs are necessary in an economic sense. Several service 
jobs held by non-Kuwaitis, especially those of domestic service, are intended mainly to 
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buy a more luxurious lifestyle rather than to enhance the productivity of the economy. In 
some cases, the presence of a housemaid may in fact have economic utility insofar as it 
facilitates women’s participation in the labor force. An examination of the employment 
of domestic helpers by Kuwaiti households indicates, however, that almost 90 % of all 
households employ a helper regardless of the work status of the women in that household 
(Shah et al, 2002).
The foregoing account for Kuwait illustrates some of the difficulties inherent in 
the replacement of foreign workers by indigenous ones.  GCC countries other than 
Kuwait are faced with very similar occupational profiles. At the political level, 
governments are totally committed to the indigenization of the population and workforce 
as a matter of strategic importance. A draft resolution to cut down the number of 
expatriates was discussed at the annual GCC summit held in Bahrain in December 2004 
where the presence of expatriates was described as “a danger for our Arab-Islamic 
culture” (Kuwait Times, December 20, 2004). The formulation and active 
implementation of the multitude of policies described above clearly reflect the concerns 
of GCC governments. 
While the intentions for restricting the inflow of foreign workers are clear and 
unequivocal and policies aimed at achieving this continue to emerge regularly, the 
recorded effectiveness of such policies presents a mixed picture. The Saudi government, 
for example, typically announces that foreigners can no longer be employed in certain 
sectors, it stages a few raids (such as on the jewelry shops mentioned above) and then 
backs off when private businesses complain they cannot operate with only Saudis 
(Migrant News, December 2005). In the travel sector, for example, Saudi Arabia was 
looking to achieve 81 percent Saudization in a period of three years starting in April 
2004. However, the response of the travel agencies to submit plans for Saudization, or 
face closure, did not initially produce a good compliance from the travel agencies (Arab 
News (Saudi Arabia), April 13, 2004). Nevertheless, the government is determined to 
push ahead with a process which it says is the key to delivering jobs to more than 
100,000 Saudis joining the labor force every year (www.gulfnews.com, March 12, 2004).  
One indicator of the limited effectiveness of policies is the increase in the 
expatriate population in Saudi Arabia from 5.02 to 5.7 million during 1999 to early 2004 
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(Arab News, April 15, 2004), and to 6.4 million in 2005 (UN, 2006a). The above trend 
may have started to reverse, however, as claimed by the Minister of Labor at a press 
conference held on September 8, 2005. According to the Minister, the recruitment of 
foreign workers in the Kingdom declined by 20.6 % while that of Saudis increased by 16 
% in the first half of 2005 compared to the year before (AMN, September 15, 2005). It is, 
however, difficult to make reliable conclusions about the trends on the basis of short-term 
observations.
In Bahrain, there is pressure on the government to allow the import of necessary 
foreign workers in order for the construction industry to function. According to a leading 
construction engineering consultant in Bahrain, there is an acute shortage of laborers in 
the country’s construction industry which is making contractors hesitant to bid for major 
jobs unless they have the necessary foreign workers (AMN, June 1-15, 2005). 
The record of some sectors in some countries appears to have been relatively 
more successful in increasing the employment of indigenous workers. In UAE, the 
banking sector has been singled out as one that has been especially effective in hiring 
nationals. Banks have worked in coordination with Tanmia (the National Human 
Resources and Employment Authority) in employing national jobseekers after putting 
them through appropriate training programs (AMN, June 16-30, 2005). However, the 
selective gains in some sectors may be counterbalanced by a disproportional higher influx 
in some other sectors. A new boom, especially in the construction sector in the UAE, 
where some of the world’s biggest development projects are underway, seems to have 
triggered an unprecedented increase in the migration of Indian workers since 2004 
(Kuwait Times, April 8, 2006).  
Recent data from Oman indicates that Oman’s foreign work force has declined by 
24 % between January 2003 and July 2005, from 549,338 to 415,135. The decline has 
been attributed to the government’s successful drive to ensure jobs for locals. The greater 
push for indigenization is likely to have been accompanied by the exceptionally high 
rates of unemployment combined with a lower level of economic development of the 
country.
Efforts by Kuwait to restrict the increase in the number of foreigners seem to have 
been at least partially successful for the last few years, judging by the relatively steady 
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proportion of non-nationals. Between 1995 and 2004, the proportion of non-Kuwaitis in 
the total population remained around 36-37 % (PACI, 1995; 2004). There seems to be a 
reversal of this in 2005, however, when the percentage of Kuwaiti nationals declined to 
34 % (PACI, 2005). The increased relative proportion suggests that immigration of non-
nationals in fact may have increased in the recent past, which in turn could be one of the 
reasons for the accelerated attempts to check such inflows. Permission to hire foreign 
nationals for the government sector was never as difficult as it is now. At the Kuwait 
University, for example, any secretary who leaves or retires may now be replaced only by 
a Kuwaiti secretary. Priority in hiring of non-academic staff is being given to Kuwaiti 
nationals and appointment requests for non-Kuwaitis are systematically being rejected. 
Also, it has been decided by the Civil Service Commission that contracts of government 
employees who have completed 30 years of service  will be terminated and this rule has 
already begun to be applied (Kuwait Times, March 4, 2006).  
There are some indications of gradual changes in attitudes of indigenous workers 
towards jobs that they had come to perceive as the work of expatriates. Examples from 
some countries such as Saudi Arabia suggest that perceptions and preferences regarding 
manual work are beginning to alter and some Saudis are entering the labor force as 
butchers, bakers and grocery baggers, work that would have been unthinkable a few years 
ago. It has also been reported that a large number of Saudi women have been applying for 
jobs as cleaners in hospitals and large companies in Al-Ahsa province, which represents a 
major break from the conservative Saudi traditions (AMN, September 16-31, 2005). In 
Bahrain, there is some indication that nationals are now willing to take up jobs that they 
traditionally shunned. For example, a survey showed that close to 70 % of Bahraini men 
and women were prepared to take on jobs as domestic workers, babysitters, care givers 
for the elderly, and drivers or gardeners. However, only 10 % of the interviewees said 
that they would actually hire a Bahraini as a domestic servant (AMN, November 1-15, 
2005).
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4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, several fundamental difficulties are present in the GCC 
government efforts to implement policies, despite their best intentions. The major 
difficulties may be summarized as follows: 1) the lucrative nature of visa trading for the 
local sponsors, along with a ready and eager market of workers willing to buy such visas; 
2) the continued reluctance of the locals to take up jobs that have come to be seen as 
“foreigner’s work” even though small attitudinal changes are beginning to be reported; 3) 
preference among nationals for public sector jobs that are almost guaranteed by virtue of 
nationality; 4) the near impossibility of the employer to fire inefficient national workers 
in the government sector, resulting in poor productivity and over-employment of 
nationals; and 5) the inherent contradiction between policies to limit the number of 
expatriate workers on the one hand and develop a thriving private sector that relies 
extremely heavily on the import of such workers to survive and flourish. In the light of 
the above constraints, it is very difficult to make any firm conclusions about the rate at 
which GCC governments will be able to replace migrant workers with indigenous ones. It 
appears that this is likely to be a slow and tedious process that will be conditional not 
only upon the above factors but also the sustained economic wellbeing of the GCC 
countries.
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Table 1- Percentage of nationals and expatriates in the population and labor force of 
GCC countries, 2005 
Population a Labor force 
Country
Total
(000s)
%
expatriates
Total
(000s)
% expatriate 
BAHRAIN 727 40.7 272 c 61.9
KUWAIT (2004) b 2,645 64.3 1,551 d 81.3
 (2005) b 2,867 65.1 1,727 d 81.8
OMAN 2,567 24.4 859 d 64.3
QATAR 813 78.3 120 c 81.6
SAUDI ARABIA 24,573 25.9 7,176 d 55.8
UAE 4,496 71.4 1,356 d 89.8
All GCC countries 35,862 35.7 11,103 About 70.0 
Sources:
a UN (2006 a)
b PACI (2004, 2005) 
c Kapizewski (2001) 
d ESCWA (2001) 
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Table 2. Male and Female Unemployment among Ages 15+ (%) 
Country (Year) Males Females
Bahrain (1991)    5.2 11.8
Kuwait (1999)   0.8   0.7 
Oman (1996) 14.2 37.0
Qatar (2001)   2.3 12.6
Saudi Arabia (2000)   3.8   9.3 
UAE (2000)   1.7   2.6 
Source: UNESCWA (2005) 
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Table 3- View and policy on immigration and emigration levels in the GCC countries, 
 2005 
Country Immigration levels 
Emigration levels 
View Policy View Policy
 2005 2005
GCC countries
Bahrain Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory No intervention 
Kuwait Too high Lower Too low No intervention 
Oman Too high Lower Satisfactory No intervention 
Qatar Too high Lower Satisfactory No intervention 
Saudi Arabia Too high Lower Satisfactory Lower
United Arab Emirates Too high Lower Satisfactory No intervention 
Source:  UN (2006 b) 
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Table 5. Occupational Distribution of Kuwaiti Males and Females, 2005(%) 
Occupation Males Females Total
Professional and 
Technical
19.1 41.6 28.3
Administrative  
and Managerial 
3.3 0.7 2.3
Clerical 51.9 43.8 48.6
Sales 1.3 0.2 0.9
Services 11.0 2.6 7.6
Agriculture and 
Fisheries
0.1 0.0 0.1
Production and 
Labor and others 
7.7 1.2 5.0
Not known 2.5 4.9 3.5
Unemployed 3.0 5.1 3.9
TOTAL 189070 131441 320511
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Table 6. Occupational Distribution of Non-Kuwaiti Males and Females, 2005(%) 
Occupation Males Females Total
Professional and 
Technical
6.5 10.1 7.3
Administrative 
and Managerial 
1.7 0.5 1.4
Clerical 9.1 6.4 8.5
Sales 5.5 2.4 4.8
Services 21.1 70.9 31.4
Agriculture and 
Fisheries
1.5 0.0 1.2
Production and 
Labor and others 
51.1 3.5 41.3
Not known 2.9 4.6 3.3
Unemployed 0.6 1.8 0.8
TOTAL 1188277 307304 1495581
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Table 7. Kuwaiti Labor Force according to Occupation, Sector of Activity and Sex,  
2005 (%) 
Males Females Total
Occupation Public Private Public Private Public Private
Professional and 
Technical
95.5 4.5 98.5 1.5 97.3 2.7
Administrative 
and Managerial 
60.2 39.8 36.7 63.3 57.1 42.9
Clerical 87.1 12.9 85.7 14.3 86.6 13.4
Sales 33.6 66.4 29.7 70.3 33.2 66.8
Services 98.8 1.2 98.3 1.7 98.7 1.3
Agriculture and 
Fisheries
98.6 1.4 100.0 0.0 98.6 1.4
Production and 
Labor and others 
97.5 2.5 97.8 2.2 97.5 2.5
Not known 88.2 11.8 59.9 40.1 71.9 28.1
Total (%) 89.3 10.7 89.9 10.1 89.6 10.4
Total number 163,790 19,588 112,263 12,512 276,053 32,100
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Figure 1:   Policies aimed at reducing the supply of, and demand for, foreign workers  
in the GCC countries 
Policies aimed at affecting: 
Supply of foreign workers Demand for indigenous workers 
? Direct and indirect taxes on 
migrant workers (e.g. health fees) 
? Periodic amnesties 
? Stricter regulation of visa issuance 
in sending countries 
? Restrictions on visa trading; 
stricter implementation of laws 
1. Creating job opportunities for 
nationals
? Vocational training for nationals 
? Enhancing private sector benefits 
2. Encouraging nationalization through 
market based measures 
? Fees for employing expatriates 
? Cash benefits for employing 
nationals
3. Forcing nationalization of labour 
force through administrative 
measures 
? Nationalization of the public-
sector work force 
? Quotas on expatriates 
? Quotas on employment of 
nationals
? Ban to hire expatriates in certain 
sectors
? Tightening of immigration 
legislation
Note:  Several of the items listed under column 2 were adapted from Table 2 in Fasano 
and Goyal (2004) 
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Appendix
DATA SOURCES TO GUIDE POLICY 
Within the GCC countries, information about the stocks, flows and characteristics 
of migrant workers is potentially available from at least three different sources that 
routinely collect such data, namely 
i) Periodic population censuses
ii) Entry and exit data from the Ministry of Interior 
iii) Civil registration data in some countries (e.g., Kuwait) 
i) Population Censuses and related publications: Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Censuses have been conducted periodically in each country. However, the regularity and 
detail of information has varied across countries (Kapizewski, 2001). Population censuses 
collect the usual socio-demographic information on items such as age, sex, nationality, 
marital status, school enrolment, education level, and occupation. Tabulations, usually 
broken down by nationals and non-nationals, are published for various characteristics. 
Data are usually not published according to the specific nationality of origin of migrant 
workers, even though this information is available in the database. In case of Kuwait, 
which has one of the best systems of data collection, some tabulation has been provided 
according to the continent of origin such as Asia, North America, and Australia etc. 
ii) Ministry of Interior Data Collection: The Ministry of Interior (or another 
immigration related Ministry) now collects computerized information on each person 
who enters or leaves the country. In case of non-visitors, i.e., residents of each of the Gulf 
countries, a residence permit (iqama) is mandatory for legal stay and is issued by the 
relevant agency upon the request of the sponsoring agency or person. In all the GCC 
countries, an iqama is required for each worker as well as each dependent. The iqama is 
issued under the sponsorship of the employer which can be an institution (e.g. A 
University, or Ministry of Health) or a private employer (e.g., a car dealer who should 
have obtained a license to hire the foreign worker). In case of domestic workers, the 
iqama is issued under the sponsorship of the private employer. For visitors, a visit visa is 
issued, usually for no more than three months. An iqama is issued for the length of the 
contract period and must be canceled before the final departure of a person from the 
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country. Contracts for expatriates usually range from one to two years, as mentioned 
earlier. Only workers earning an income above a specified minimum level are allowed to 
bring their family with them. In Kuwait, for example, those earning a monthly salary less 
than KD 250 (US $ 850) in the government sector or KD 450 (US $ 1530) in the private 
sector can not bring in their family. For the dependents of a worker, he/she is the sponsor. 
In case of an expatriate’s children, the sons can stay in the country until they reach age 21 
and daughters until they get married. 
For each resident the Ministry of Interior collects basic socio-demographic 
information such as age, sex, nationality, and marital status. This information is, 
however, used only for official purposes and no routine publications are provided on the 
basis of such data. Occasionally, newspaper articles may report the number of nationals 
from different countries. 
iii) Civil Identification Information: In some countries, such as Kuwait, a system of 
civil registration that collects, and publishes, basic civil information for each resident 
(national as well as non-national) has emerged over the last 15 years or so. An 
independent, semi-autonomous authority, known as the Public Authority for Civil 
Information (PACI) has been created by the Kuwaiti government for this purpose. A civil 
identification (ID) card that is required for most transactions within the country must be 
applied for within one month after the iqama is issued. Delay in obtaining the civil ID 
card results in a fine. The PACI database is fully computerized and is linked to the 
Ministry of Interior database by a unique number.  
Beginning in 1989, the PACI in Kuwait has been publishing an annual report on 
population and labor force statistics which is available for public use. Annual reports 
were not published for the period from 1990-93 owing to the first Gulf war when Iraq 
occupied Kuwait. The PACI annual report provides tabulations on characteristics such as 
age, sex, marital status, educational level, occupation, industry, and sector of economic 
activity for Kuwaiti nationals and non-nationals. No tables are published according to the 
specific nationality of major migrant groups. Some tables are available according to the 
continent of origin. 
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International Data Sources  
Published comparative data for the six GCC countries is rare. In terms of the 
stocks and flows of migrants from various countries, there is no regular publication 
within the region that provides comparative migration data. At the international level, at 
least three data bases may be identified as constituting important sources of information 
on the stocks and flows of migration in the region. First, the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) that published information on major 
socio-demographic characteristics of the populations of the member states, 
disaggregating it by nationals and non-nationals. After 2001, ESCWA discontinued the 
publication of this series making it even harder to analyze migration to various Gulf 
countries. ESCWA, however, did not provide any information on stocks of migrants by 
nationality, even in terms of Arab/non-Arab background, or on country of origin.  
Second, the International Labor Organization (ILO) provides information through its 
International Labor Migration data base 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/ilmdb/ilmdb.htm) for several 
countries on the annual flows and stocks according to the major countries where migrants 
currently reside. Only three of the six GCC countries are listed in this database, and 
limited data are available only for very general and broad items. Finally, the United 
Nations Population Division periodically publishes data on the migration stocks, flows 
and policies of various countries. Data of international agencies are based on information 
provided by national governments who usually obtain such information from their Labor 
and Manpower ministries, or through specific statistical bodies within certain ministries.  
International surveys on migration are rare. Periodic efforts by academic 
institutions and other agencies have resulted in the publication of books that enable us to 
piece together a picture of migration patterns in the GCC countries (e.g., Arnold and 
Shah, 1986; Birks and Sinclair, 1980; Serow et al, 1990; Longva, 1997; Kapiszewski, 
2001). However, there is no international agency with the primary goal to collect, 
compile, publish and analyse migration dynamics in this region.  
Some agencies and individuals have made an effort to provide a compilation of 
migration statistics, trends, and policies. Three different sources that have been providing 
electronic information for several years are as follows. The first one is a compilation of 
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news items by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) in Washington, D.C. sent on a 
weekly basis to interested recipients. The second is a monthly newsletter published by the 
University of California at Davis, produced under the leadership of Philip Martin. The 
third is a bi-monthly newsletter from the Scalabrini Migration Center in the Philippines 
on Asian Migration News (AMN). All these sources provide very useful information for 
various parts of the world including the GCC countries. Their information is especially 
helpful in terms of gathering and disseminating information from media reports and 
unofficial channels.
GCC countries vary in terms of the detail and regularity with which they collect 
information. This is in turn reflected in the detail and reliability of the data compiled by 
international agencies. In Saudi Arabia, the largest receiving country in the Arab world, 
current population size is a "state secret" according to Courbage (1999). Lack of 
published evidence on the nationality composition of the residents in Saudi Arabia makes 
it difficult to attach full credence to the available data. Among the GCC countries, 
Kuwait has a fairly large amount of regularly published data. However, it also presents a 
problem in terms of analysis beyond broad categories since it does not publish any data 
according to country of origin, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the definition of who 
constitutes a Kuwaiti national has undergone change during the last two decades with the 
exclusion of stateless persons from the Kuwaiti category, thus resulting in some 
confusion. A careful examination of the data sources and quality of various GCC 
countries led Evans and Papps (1999) to conclude that with the exception of Kuwait, 
"official sources of data on national and non-national populations of GCC countries 
provide fragmentary, intermittent and often unreliable information".  
Conclusions on the current situation of migrant stocks and flows, or 
characteristics of migrants must therefore be pieced together from diverse sources, 
including newspaper reports which may sometimes lack the desired amount of accuracy. 
Lack of timely and routinely available data on the subject makes the analysis of trends 
especially difficult. Also, a discrepancy between different data sources complicates the 
task of drawing any final conclusions about the preponderance of migrant workers and 
their dependents in the Gulf. Media reports are not always consistent about the total 
number of foreigners in the total population or the labor force. Data sources also differ in 
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terms of the percentage of the private sector comprised by Saudi nationals from 5-13 %. 
Hence, several questions remain about the reliability of the data presented by various 
sources.
The dearth of published information is a serious handicap in analyzing the trends 
and patterns relating to the stocks and flows of migrants in the Gulf. When reviewing 
estimates provided by different authors, one is faced with inconsistencies that are hard to 
explain. No single, reliable data source is available for a consistent analysis of trends and 
composition. In their efforts towards better cooperation the development of an accurate, 
comparative database on migration statistics that could guide policy does not appear to be 
a priority. The major efforts at cooperation are usually limited to better border controls.
The GCC countries do have the financial and technical resources to develop a 
good database. It also has the electronic ability and expertise. It needs to mobilize the 
political will and create the necessary administrative mechanisms that may enable an 
improvement in migration statistics, both within each country and in a comparative 
manner. United Nations agencies within the region, such as ESCWA, could be requested 
to provide the necessary technical support, if needed. If such a database is developed and 
made available to the public, interested researchers could conduct the necessary studies 
that may provide the analysis for more objective and evidence-based policy making in 
future.
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